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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
New FSB structure 
RF President Vladimir Putin issued a somewhat terse decree on 11 August, 
which outlines a new structure for the leadership of the Federal Security Service 
(FSB). 
 
According to the edict (No. 960, signed 11 Aug 03; Financial Times Information, 
15 Aug 03; Global Newswire via Lexis-Nexis), the FSB "is entitled to have two 
first deputy directors …; [one of whom] is head of the Border Services; a 
secretary of state who is deputy director of [the FSB]; another deputy director 
[whose duties are not spelled out] ; six deputy directors who are heads of 
departments [within the FSB]; and a deputy director who is chief of the [FSB] 
Inspectorate; and to form a Collegium of 19 members." 
 
As is often the case, the nature of the individuals who fill the stipulated posts 
likely will determine the relative influence of the position. A much longer 
presidential decree has spelled out, in great detail, the responsibilities of the FSB 
and will be covered in an upcoming N.I.S. Observed. 
 
Apparatus politics (Woe from wit) 
The first few years of Putin's ascendancy in Moscow, observers and analysts 
catalogued the travails of the satellite apparatchiki who glided through Kremlin 
intrigues with the dour Judo whiz, finally landing with dazzling success at the 
pinnacle of Russian power. Even through the first two years of his Presidency, 
Putin-watchers worried over the number of St. Petersburgers who followed their 
mentor from the frozen North to the gilded halls. Insulating himself from the 
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clannish Yel'tsin staffers with his own personnel, Putin would ferret out the 
bureaucratic corruption and punish those who prospered from Russia's weak 
state in the 1990's. Or so we could be excused for thinking…. 
 
Perhaps the Petersburgers would grow too powerful along their march to glory 
and, in the euphoria of Kremlin intrigues, overstep their authority -- endangering 
society with their lawless loyalty to Putin. As their devotion clashed with the 
ideals of democratic, market transformation, the seasoned 'reformers' of the 
Yel'tsin era warned of a 'cult of personality' and unchecked ambition. 
 
If these scenarios sound vaguely familiar, it's because they were, all too often, 
tales spun for journalists by a deep Kremlin insider, who, no matter how many 
times he teases with a new conspiracy tale, seems to have an uncanny inside 
track on the apparat. 
 
Yes, it's Gleb Pavlovsky. And yes, he has gone flying off the tracks on occasion: 
the hysteria about a "Hasidic-paramasonic" conspiracy back in 2000 (The 
Moscow Times, 5 Oct 00 via Lexis-Nexis) when Berezovsky and Gusinsky were 
targets du jour of the regime; and the leak of the "Version-1" mutinous drafts [for 
which he spent four days in Lefortovo, courtesy of Sergei Stepashin (Moscow 
News, No. 48, 28 Nov 01 via Lexis-Nexis)] back when he thought Kremlin 
powerhouse Korzhakov buttered his bread. All in all however, he has either been 
tuned directly in to the "under-the-rug" apparat infighting, or propagandizing for 
one Kremlin strongman or t'other directing the analysts' focus from enemy to prey 
with remarkable agility. 
 
These days however, he seems surprisingly reliable. And these days, he wants 
us to understand that the real danger is the current battle between the former 
security officers (siloviki) and the oligarchs. Once again, what we really seem to 
be facing is a conflict between old and new money -- with old being defined as 
"90s" -- perhaps money is too constricting a category, but it seems to lie at the 
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heart of the matter. The former KGB/FSB guys (among them, more than a few 
St. Petersburgers) want access to the trappings of wealth, which often translates 
directly to political power (or simply buys political perks). Given the enthusiastic 
patronage of Putin, it may seem counterintuitive that security service officers 
would need greater access to political power. The key may now be found less in 
their need to increase their own access than in their desire to restrict the access, 
and therefore the power (and consequently independence) of other groups. 
 
The siloviki seem keenly aware that money is fungible: their concern that Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and Yukos were turning their wealth into political clout and police 
protection almost certainly precipitated this summer's moves against the Yukos 
clan. 
 
Pavlovsky, speaking now for the former 'Family' members and their wealthy 
patrons, warns that a "minority" within the presidential administration is on the 
political attack "in opposition to the course of President Putin." (OFFICIAL 
KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST, 2 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Pavlovsky's warning are dire: "The President will be actually put under their 
control." (Ibid.) In this, he seems to long for the period of the Yel'tsin 
administration when factions were calmly played off against one another: no one 
group gained supremacy until Yel'tsin succumbed to illness and control in the 
Kremlin passed to the 'Family'. Perhaps Pavlovsky's awareness of the ability of 
one faction to seize opportunities to defeat the other makes him particularly 
sensitive to the threat posed by the powerful siloviki. Perhaps he has his own 
patrons to pacify or he realizes the FSB men know the skeletons in his own 
closet, either way, Pavlovsky's vulnerability may provide a peek under the rug at 
Kremlin dirt. 
 
Pavlovsky provides us (and presumably therefore the President) with a list of 
names of the new mutinous conspirators: Presidential Administration Deputies 
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Viktor Ivanov and Igor Sechin and the wealthy business men connected to them -
- Sergei Pugachev, Rosneft head Sergei Bogdanchikov and Veremeyenko. (Ibid.) 
Some were involved earlier this year in an attack on the power of the oligarchs, 
which likely unleashed this backlash. The difference between tit-for-tat 
accusations and its colleague, the kompromat war, and a more serious threat to 
Russian political society lies in the response of the President. Will Putin take the 
bait and purge a 'disloyal opposition' or will the fur continue to fly? An answer 
may have to wait for election results. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
And now for the economy 
President Vladimir Putin’s decree on the security services, signed on 15 August, 
indicates that, for the moment at least, formal restructuring of the Federal 
Security Service (FSB) is over. The Presidential Decree established a new 
command structure for the Security Service. According to the legislation, several 
new Deputy-Directorships will be created, and the FSB from now on will be 
governed by a Collegium of 19 members. [(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Aug 03; 
Financial Times via Lexis-Nexis) For further details see "Executive Branch" 
above] 
 
Judging by recent events, however, the FSB’s mission to increase its influence 
over Russian society will continue unabated. Not only is the FSB rumored 
effectively to have taken control of both the Interior Ministry and the GRU, but 
also, as of 1 September, the FSB’s purview also extends into the 
private/economic sector: the new Vice-President of the Alrosa diamond company 
is FSB Colonel Yuri Ionov. There are conflicting explanations for Ionov’s 
appointment. The Government’s line is that Ionov has been appointed to protect 
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the company’s economic security. His job description is, in effect, to counter 
industrial espionage. 
 
An unnamed source within the company, however, is quoted by Kommersant 
(PRIME-TASS News Wire, 20 August 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) as 
having said that the Federal Government is seeking to gain control of the firm’s 
cashflow, by obtaining an 8 percent stake in the company, and that Ionov is to 
"act on behalf of the government" in order to attain this goal. 
 
While the FSB’s level of penetration of all levels of society is extremely 
disconcerting, there is some small encouragement to be gained from the fact that 
there have been two recent articles in the Russian press (both published by 
Nezavisimaya gazeta) addressing this issue. On 29 August, Nezavisimaya 
gazeta carried a story in which the author, Alexander Bovin, wrote that "Military 
and Security people in government are becoming a danger to the nation." Bovin 
noted that over half of the Security Council seats are occupied by former Security 
Service Officers, that five of seven super—governors are Generals, and that 
some 6,000 ex-KGB/FSB officers "hold important positions in the State 
Apparatus." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 29 Aug 03 via What the Papers Say via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
At this point, Bovin halts his analysis. Rather than posing serious questions as to 
Putin’s motivation, Bovin prefers to assume that the President was simply 
misguided and perhaps naïve in placing his FSB cronies in positions of power: 
 
"I don’t know whether Putin understood that in promoting senior officers to serve 
as the pillar of the State, and surrounding himself with the military, he would have 
to satisfy their corporate interests, at least partially, sooner or later. Perhaps he 
failed to understand that." (Ibid.) The previous story, an interview with Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya, a faculty member at the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
reached the same conclusion about the presence of (former) security officers. 
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"Not everything Putin does is to their liking; but they view him as one of their own, 
and hope that the President will give them a chance to run the country. That is, 
they hope he will permit them to ‘restore order’ as they understand it, and as they 
hope Putin understands it too." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Aug 20 03; WPS via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Based on the fact that much, if not all, of the FSB’s power stems directly from the 
Presidential Apparatus, including Presidential decrees, which have the force of 
law, it is difficult to grant any credibility to Bovin and Kryshtanovskaya’s pretense 
of Presidential naivety. One can only conclude that the economic sector is simply 
the next target in the FSB’s campaign forever increasing influence. 
 
Anti-terrorist agencies gone AWOL? 
Since the blast at the Mozdok Military hospital compound on August 1, there 
have been two further serious terrorist incidents in Russia. First, in Krasnodar 
(Southern Federal District) on August 25, three simultaneous explosions tore 
through the town. The blasts resulted in three deaths, and twenty persons were 
wounded. (RIA; Oreanda-Economic News from Regions, 25 Aug 03 via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The second, more serious, attack occurred on 3 September in the Stavropol 
region, where a commuter train traveling near Kislovodsk was blown up. Six 
people were killed in the blast. Investigators from the FSB and Interior Ministries 
discovered two craters along the tracks, which, they have claimed, are consistent 
with 5-KG charges of TNT, detonated remotely. (IZVESTIA PRESS DIGEST, 4 
Sept 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Blame for both acts has been placed squarely at the door of Chechen terrorists, 
with Nikolai Khazikov, Chief of the Caucasus Regional Prosecutor General’s 
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Office, hinting that Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basaev were the instigators of 
the operation. 
 
In the aftermath of the Mozdok bombing, it was easy to raise suspicion that some 
terrorist acts were being allowed to take place in order to strengthen the position 
of the Security Services. It is now almost impossible to avoid such a conclusion, 
based on Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov’s statement in the wake of the first of 
these most recent attacks, that domestic legislation to enhance the authority of 
the security services in their efforts to counter terrorism is expected in 
September. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 26 Aug 03 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
It would seem the Security Services might not be satisfied with anything short of 
full control. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Iraq — Is Russia jumping the fence or just walking it? 
Last spring the Berlin-Paris-Moscow alliance made rough going for the U.S. in its 
bid for international unity against Iraq, but half a year later the partnership may 
have lost a member. Russia now appears ready to participate in the 
reconstruction of Iraq as evidenced by President Putin's statement that he "sees 
nothing bad" in sending peacekeeping troops to Iraq under a U.S. command. 
(RIA NOVOSTI, 30 Aug 03 via www.pravda.ru); although military officers have 
stated that these should not be combat troops. The main sticking point remains 
the revised resolution that the U.S. has submitted to the Security Council in draft 
form. Although Russia’s foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, stated that the draft 
resolution needs "serious work" before it could be considered acceptable, 
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Moscow has not yet rejected it completely as Paris and Berlin have. (REUTERS, 
5 Sep 03 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #7313, 7 Sep 03) 
 
Though it may have been publicly impossible for Moscow to support the U.S. call 
for war in Iraq, now that it is a fait accompli, the Kremlin appears to be looking at 
the matter in more practical terms. There are genuine economic benefits to 
consider. These potential profits include oil deals and other trade agreements 
made prior to the collapse of the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein totaling 
nearly U.S. $40 billion. (NIS OBSERVED, Volume VIII, No. 12, 30 Jul 03) If 
Moscow resists American leadership and rejects participating in rebuilding Iraq, it 
could stand to lose not only money and prestige, but a role in Middle Eastern 
affairs as well. 
 
Moscow’s circumscribed willingness to support Washington in its effort to gain 
UN support for reconstructing Iraq may be a handy piece of leverage as 
President Putin heads to the U.S. on 24 September to address the UN General 
Assembly and then to visit President Bush. Washington may appreciate the 
assistance of a Russian peacekeeping contingent – a contribution that could 
inspire others, such as Turkey or India, who are on the fence about contributing 
troops (pending a new UN resolution and arrangements concerning the 
command of the peacekeeping forces). 
 
It remains to be seen, however, if Moscow will remain so amenable to the idea of 
contributing forces and allowing them to be under direct American command. It 
wasn’t long ago that very serious, complicated negotiations and special 
command arrangements were necessary before Russian forces participated as 
members of the Bosnian and Kosovo peacekeeping forces. Additionally, there 
are inherent dangers in getting personally involved with the peacekeeping efforts 
in Iraq. Moscow currently is trying to gain influence in the Muslim world by 
applying for membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 
which was just recently discussed with a visiting delegation from Saudi Arabia. 
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(ITAR-TASS, 27 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0827 via World news Connection) 
Cooperating with the U.S. in the occupation of Iraq could be seen negatively by 
other Islamic states. Moreover, even though President Putin’s re-election bid is 
probably solid enough to weather almost any negative fallout, the possible loss of 
Russian lives in Iraq occupation operations could prove an untenable risk in the 
upcoming election season. 
 
Timing is everything - Russia stays the course on Bushehr 
Despite U.S. protests, Moscow continues to move forward in its nuclear 
relationship with Iran. In late August, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, John Bolton, visited Moscow to discuss issues 
pertaining to Iran and North Korea. Mr. Bolton left Russia without significant 
results as Moscow is holding firm to its position despite public pressure from the 
U.S. State Department, which stressed that no country, including Russia, should 
engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran until Tehran addresses the questions 
posed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the 
international community. (REUTERS, 27 Aug 03 via JRL #7304, 28 Aug 03) 
Despite indications to the contrary, Russia insists that its cooperation with Iran is 
completely transparent and directed solely towards peaceful, civilian purposes. 
 
Unnamed Russian sources stated diplomatically that the meeting between Bolton 
and Russian officials, including the Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr 
Rumyantsev and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak, confirmed that the U.S. 
and Russia have "a common understanding of the need to work for Iran’s greater 
openness in the nuclear sphere," (INTERFAX, 26 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0826 
via World News Connection), however, Russia also countered U.S. complaints 
by claiming that certain Western nations may be contributing to the suspected 
Iranian nuclear weapons program. No further details were given. (Agent France 
Presse (AFP), 26 Aug 03 via JRL #7302, 27 Aug 03) Iranian press reports hailed 
Russia’s steadfastness and determination to continue the Russian-Iranian 
nuclear power project despite U.S. pressure. It viewed Russia’s resistance to the 
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U.S. as evidence that the U.S. position lacks rational arguments. (VOICE OF 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN RADIO 1, 25 Aug 03; FBIS-NES-2003-0825 
VIA World News Connection) 
 
Russia and Iran apparently have addressed a major U.S. complaint concerning 
spent nuclear fuel produced at the Bushehr plant. The danger of such fuel is that 
it could be used to produce weapons grade plutonium. But on 27 August the 
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy stated that the Russian government had 
approved amendments to the Bushehr construction agreement that would 
obligate Iran to return the spent fuel to Russia. This amendment is expected to 
be signed by the two countries at the IAEA general session in Vienna 15-18 
September 2003. (INTERFAX, 27 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0827 via World News 
Connection) Once signed, Russia could begin delivery of nuclear fuel to Bushehr. 
However, there is no indication of any willingness to accept international 
supervision of the amendment's implementation. 
 
Iran, of course, has to face the latest report from the IAEA that traces of uranium 
(beyond what is needed for civilian purposes) were detected in an Iranian 
centrifuge, a device critical in the production of weapons grade material. This 
may cause even Russia to tread more cautiously until matters are ironed out. 
The 15—18 September general session of the IAEA in Vienna may clarify where 
the agency stands with regard to Iran’s nuclear activities. However, Moscow has 
to deal also with a report on 22 August that Latvian customs officials in Riga had 
intercepted a Russian vessel bound for Iran loaded with 28 tons of military 
equipment including night vision devices and spare tank parts. The vessel has 
been detained on suspicion of smuggling strategic goods. (WWW.GAZETA.RU, 
21 Aug 03 via RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 160, Part II, 22 Aug 03) 
 
Nevertheless, Moscow maintains the offensive on the Iran issue; following 
Bolton’s departure; Russian media reported a Russian plan to build a second 
reactor at Bushehr. So far Moscow reportedly has handed over a feasibility study 
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to Tehran regarding the construction of such a second reactor. (ITAR-TASS, 26 
Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0826 via World News Connection) The timing of this 
move following discussions with Undersecretary Bolton appears to demonstrate 
Russian resolve to disregard US concerns over continuing Russian-Iranian 
nuclear cooperation. 
 
However, Moscow’s decision to postpone a scheduled meeting between a 
visiting Iranian parliamentarian delegation and Russian parliamentarians on 2 
September (ITAR-TASS, 2 Sep 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) could indicate that the Kremlin is choosing to maneuver more 
cautiously in light of the upcoming IAEA’s board of governors meeting in Vienna 
on 8 September where, according to U.S. officials, the IAEA could take "various 
actions" regarding Iran. (WWW.CNN.COM, 5 Sep 03) Indeed Moscow may be 
hesitant to commit completely to its support of Iran until the timing is right, i.e., 
until the U.S. appears most vulnerable. Specifically, Russia might view the best 
opportunity to try to soften Washington’s opposition to its cooperation with Iran as 
the moment at which it can offer its support to the White House on the issue of a 
new UN resolution on Iraq. Putin’s visit with President Bush late in September 
may be just the occasion to test those waters. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
It’s my party, and I’ll cry if I want to 
Despite a pledge of good behavior signed by a little more than half (27 out of 43) 
of the parties involved in the upcoming parliamentary race, mud — not to 
mention charges of interference and chicanery — has begun to be slung. 
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Chief among the slingers is Gennadi Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party. 
Zyuganov, along with Union of Right Forces leader Boris Nemtsov, has 
complained that their respective parties are facing an information blockade due 
to the lack of independent media in the country, a blockade each plans to attack 
through regional appearances by party representatives. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Aug 03; 
Global News Wire; World News Connection via Lexis-Nexis and NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 27 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Moreover, Zyuganov has complained, not without cause, of Kremlin-backed 
attempts to chip away support from the KPRF, which polls continuously at 
approximately the same level of support as "Putin’s party," United Russia. The 
latest endeavor, he says, is a move by Dmitri Rogozin, chairman of the 
Federation Council and Putin’s envoy on Kaliningrad-related matters, along with 
Sergei Glazyev, the leader of Russia’s Regions and a member of the Communist 
faction in the State Duma, to form an election bloc of nationalist groups — groups 
previously aligned with the KPRF. 
 
One is tempted to ascribe the bloc’s founding to a confluence of forces that 
includes ambition and a forward-looking attitude brought in by the younger 
politicians, with the power of Kremlin support. Glazyev had been considered a 
possible modernizing force for Russian communists, a transformation Zyuganov 
rigorously opposes. Indeed, in a text intended for Pravda (but distributed to other 
media outlets), Zyuganov wrote that his party remains closer to communism’s 
"primordial principles" than similar parties in Europe that have taken a path 
unacceptable to Russians. (THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 22 Aug 03; 
Emerging Markets Datafile via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
It is impossible, however, to overlook the insignificance of the parties that have 
joined the election bloc, as well as the haphazard manner of its formation. The 
bloc has no name, the rather hazy goal of uniting "all patriotic forces" to work on 
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a program "of national interests," (RIA NEWS AGENCY, 1055 GMT, 24 Aug 03; 
BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) and a fuzzy membership -- according to various 
reports, 15, 16 or17 parties have joined. There is also the logistical problem of 
the distribution of seats — with no shared platform and so many members — if 
(and it’s a big if) the bloc does manage to overcome the 5% minimum percentage 
of votes, who will have allocated the seats? If the statements made since the 
coalition was announced on 22 August provide any indication, the aim is to 
harness popular discontent and nostalgia for the "good old days" of Soviet 
domination. Parties that have joined the movement include the Congress of 
Russian Communities, Russia’s Regions, the Party of Labor, Native Fatherland 
Movement, For Holy Russia, Russia Traditional Party, Eurasia (not the better-
known Eurasian Party), People’s and Patriotic Union of Youth, Soyuz Movement, 
and the Social and Democratic Organization. (KOMMERSANT, 25 Aug 03; What 
the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis) Certainly, such a collection puts into 
doubt that this bloc is intended as a vehicle for Glazyev to modernize anything. 
 
Subsequent efforts by the bloc have focused on attracting big names that solidify 
thoughts of nostalgia, such as the former chairman of the Central Bank, Viktor 
Gerashchenko, the Commander-in-Chief of the Airborne Troops, Colonel 
General Georgi Shpak, (KOMMERSANT, 26 Aug 03; WPS via Lexis-Nexis) and 
former Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces General Valentin Varennikov, 
Rogozin’s "idol in the early 1990s," who, as a member of the rebellious State 
Emergency Committee, refused an amnesty for the August 1991 attempted coup. 
(ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 27 Aug 03; WPS via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
To be sure, Rogozin is no stranger to rhetoric harkening back to the time when 
Russia successfully bulldozed its neighbors, ignoring notions of territorial 
sovereignty, but that tactic hasn’t really worked in a while — he saw that himself 
in Russia’s recent attempts to force Lithuania to back down over transit 
regulations concerning Kaliningrad. And, indeed, it seems that the Federation 
Council speaker hasn’t overcome the disappointment of seeing the European 
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Union side with Lithuania on the issue, as his statements demonstrate. "We will 
deal with the Kaliningrad problem until we feel that even those small restrictions 
which today exist for citizens’ transit travel and those restrictions which they are 
trying to impose on us regarding the transit of cargo... will be dully removed," 
Rogozin said. (RTR RUSSIA TV, 1600 GMT, 24 Aug 03; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
It is this preoccupation with the past -- a well-trodden plank in the communist 
platform — which makes the creation of the election bloc so suspect. Rogozin 
and Glazyev repeatedly have issued calls for the Communist Party to join, which 
Zyuganov and others (not surprisingly) have declined repeatedly. "We can’t join 
this coalition!.. If we join it, we would betray our voters, because we suspect that 
this coalition was created on the Kremlin’s orders, for the purpose of holding 
back the [KPRF]," explained Yuri Petrakov, a party representative. 
(KOMMERSANT, 25 Aug 03; WPS via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
It is not inconceivable that the Kremlin did have a hand in the creation of the bloc, 
but apparently Moscow’s willingness to intervene in the election process, at least 
to support United Russia, is not wholehearted. In the regions, the Kremlin is seen 
as having schemed to keep United Russia from becoming too comfortable with 
its position of most-favored party. A new regional movement called New Russia 
has emerged in Tula, led by a provincial MP, Aleksei Berezin. The movement’s 
platform explicitly includes the goal of luring away at least 20 percent of United 
Russia’s current membership, as payback for United Russia’s refusal to support 
Berezin in the upcoming State Duma elections. Where does the Kremlin fit in this 
tale of revenge? Despite Berezin’s statements that the movement is supported 
by owners of small- and medium-sized businesses, rumors are rampant that the 
chief sponsor is a large state-owned oil company. (RUSSKY KURYER, 22 Jul 03; 
The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 55, No. 29 via Lexis-Nexis) 
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The Central Election Commission (CEC) is keeping its official eye on the election 
scene, though its effectiveness remains open to question. The commission 
certainly is devoting a substantial amount of time to media coverage; indeed, 
more attention seems to be spent on what is written about the process than on 
the process itself. To help earnest journalists navigate the tricky shoals of newly 
promulgated election-related legislation, the CEC is working on an informational 
brochure, "The Mass Media and the Elections; Questions and Answers." Touting 
such admirable principles as objective and accurate reporting, the publication 
assures the media that there is no prohibition on analyzing a candidate’s pre-
election activity as they inform voters, although successfully influencing voters by 
"purposefully and systematically creat[ing] a positive or negative attitude... toward 
candidates" is unacceptable. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 21 Aug 03; Global 
News Wire; via World News Connection via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
That is not the only training the CEC is offering, however. The Commission’s 
Russian Center for the Study of Election Technologies recently sent some 
reporters to a region where a gubernatorial campaign is underway, to note the 
success of election laws. Yet, while the laws apparently worked on the surface, a 
closer look revealed the continued circumvention of regulations, by such means 
as media manipulation, dishonest signature collections and underhanded, 
premature advertising. "Everything was done the way people do. Or rather, the 
way candidates do — people in fact are not paying nearly the close attention to 
what is happening that politicians would like," reporter Yekaterina Dobrynina 
explained. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 28 Aug 03; FBIS-2003-0828 via World 
News Connection) 
 
Interestingly, all this activity is playing out against a backdrop of anticipated voter 
apathy. There has been a steady increase in the number of voters selecting 
"against all," and at least one Moscow-based newspaper warns that a potential 
increase in that number could "squeeze United Russia from second place." 
(VREMYA MN, 12 Aug 03; Global Newswire; World News Connection via Lexis-
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Nexis) Of course, such a scenario is unlikely, though not impossible, particularly 
if recent polls are to be believed. The Regional Politics Research Agency, a 
division of the ROMIR Monitoring agency, recently released the results of a poll 
of residents in 32 Russian regions. When asked who holds real power in the 
country, most respondents (37 percent) indicated their belief that oligarchs, not 
politicians, are in charge; only 4 percent responded that the Duma held the real 
power. (VEDOMOSTI, 27 Aug 03; WPS via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
JUDICIARY 
It’s my party, and I’ll try what I want to 
The Constitutional Court recently demonstrated its own brand of independence 
from the Kremlin, by removing a powerful tool the federal government had used 
to keep rebellious (and, possibly, independence-leaning) regions in line. The 
court ruled that the attempts by the prosecutor’s office to seek decisions from 
general courts on the constitutionality of regional laws were themselves 
unconstitutional. Only the Constitutional Court gets to decide that (which is 
probably why it’s called the Constitutional Court). Still, the folks in Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan, the most visible targets of the prosecutor-general’s office in this 
regard, should not plan victory rallies anytime soon. The decision does not 
necessarily invalidate earlier general court rulings that, in the main, supported 
federal attempts to overhaul regional legislation which provided for any degree of 
autonomy. It does, however, offer those regions, and the rest of the Russian 
Federation, the opportunity to appeal the rulings. (KOMMERSANT, 19 Jul 03; 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The prosecutor’s office had more success in another ruling, the conviction on 
charges of libel of journalist and politician German Galkin from Chelyabinsk. The 
ruling was most surprising in its sentence: While previously such convictions 
ended with a fine or, at most, a suspended sentence, Galkin faces one year of 
corrective labor in a prison colony. He was found guilty of libel for a series of 
articles which implied that Chelyabinsk Vice Governor Konstantin Bochkarev was 
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a pedophile and that Bochkarev, as well as Vice Governor Andrei Kosilov, were 
guilty of professional criminal activity. "Galkin accused me and my colleague of 
having committed a whole range of especially serious crimes — participation in 
an organized crime grouping, serving the interests of the narcotics mafia, 
embezzlement of budget funds, paying off officials, organizing murders for hire, 
creating financial pyramids...," Kosilov said. (IZVESTIYA, 20 Aug 03; Global 
News Wire; World News Connection via Lexis-Nexis) While Glakin denies he 
wrote the articles, evidence indicates he was, at least, one of the persons who 
edited the publication. 
 
It may be premature, however, to assume that the Galkin sentence signals a 
hardening of judicial attitudes towards the media, given the political nature of the 
publication in question as well as the types of accusations contained in the 
articles. Still, the severity of the sentence and the charges brought against 
Galkin, for articles whose authorship cannot be proved, guarantee that the 
media, and media analysts, will be watching the situation carefully. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly and Paul Lyons 
 
Bosnia, Kosovo…next stop, Iraq? 
Keeping his eye fixed firmly on the long-term goal of ensuring a Russian role as a 
major world player, President Putin may soon send Russian units to join the U.S., 
U.K., Poland and others in Iraq. (RFE/RL Security and Foreign Policy in Russia, 
9 Sep 03) 
 
Almost daily since late August, Russian officials have dropped hints about their 
willingness to reconsider the Iraqi issue and perhaps contribute an (as yet 
undefined) number of troops to the task of occupation and reconstruction. (AFP 
via Lexis-Nexis, 9 Sep 03; and various RFE/RL Newslines 27 Aug to 9 Sep 03) 
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One condition mentioned consistently is the need for Russian elements to 
operate under a "UN mandate" – depending on the outcome of negotiations 
sponsored by UN. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, this may be as modest as a 
new UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) for "cover" or, if France and 
Germany supported by Russia and China can prevail over the U.S. and U.K., it 
may mean an entirely new political and "peacekeeping" structure. (Reuters via 
RFE/RL, 5 Sep 03) In fact, US Secretary of State Colin Powell will meet this 
weekend with Annan and the foreign ministers from the five members of the UN 
Security Council to discuss the issue. (AFP via Lexis-Nexis, 9 Sep 03) 
 
Russia’s consideration of these possibilities entails evolution of the previous 
opposition to the war, and may mean a Russian approach separate from that of 
Germany and France, its earlier partners. All three still want the UN to play a 
major role but, Russia is hinting that it may settle for a U.S. General in charge of 
military forces in Iraq, as well as the U.S.-appointed administrator and Governing 
Council. (AFP, 9 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis; and RFE/RL Newsline, 5 Sep 03) The 
adjustment in the Russian approach was signalled during a press conference 
with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in Sardinia on 30 August, when 
President Vladimir Putin said he "sees nothing wrong if [a peacekeeping 
contingent] is under U.S. command." (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 Sep 03) 
 
Russia may have picked up on a shift in U.S. thinking as policymakers began to 
explore the idea of expanding the number of multi-national troops on the ground, 
both to make the military presence more palatable to Iraqis and to reduce the 
strain on limited American military resources, allowing the armed services to 
regroup and prepare for future operations in the war on terror. (ITAR-TASS, 23 
Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0823 via World News Connection) This adjustment of 
U.S. policy, includes a draft UNSCR that, irrespective of its final form, will allow 
the UN, i.e. the permanent members of the Security Council, a larger role. This 
adjustment was signaled in President Bush’s speech to the nation on 7 Sep 03. 
(www.ap.org, 7 Sep 03) 
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In mid-August, Russian officials began to hedge their bets and start evaluating 
the benefits of joining the multi-national coalition in Iraq, as intimations of the 
possible adjustment in U.S. policy became known. The considerations involved in 
Russia's reevaluation may have included the desire for at least a portion of 
Russia's long-term influence in Iraq, including the ability to recover eventually 
part of the debt Iraq owes Moscow, and the hope of "scoring points" in 
Washington by adopting a line distinct from the approach of the Berlin-Paris Axis. 
Colonel General Vladimir Kulakov, a member of the Federation Council, referring 
to Russia's major political and commercial interests in Iraq and throughout the 
area pointed out that they could be best served by Russia contributing a large 
force to the stabilization and reconstruction effort in Iraq. He added, "Iraq owes 
us $8 billion. In addition, we have traditionally had strong economic ties to this 
country. Our oil and construction companies are hoping to resume them not in 
the distant, but in the very near, future." (emphasis added) Although he called for 
Russia to insist on a UN peacekeeping operation, the latest American draft UN 
Security Council Resolution may help to serve as political cover. (Trud, 27 Aug 
03; FBIS-NES-2003-0827 via World News Connection) 
 
What are the options? 
In Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), the Russian Federation attempted to 
establish itself as a supporter both of its Slav "kin" in the Balkans and of the "new 
world order." At the time, economics and a seriously debilitated military (not to 
mention the fact that, in Kosovo, Russia's entry was unilateral and surreptitious), 
meant sending on a small force to each operation, and in both cases, the 
Russian forces proved competent, though not outstanding, at their task. 
Moreover, they established a reputation for not being entirely neutral. 
 
If really willing, Russia could make a positive contribution in view of an improving 
economy. Russia may be able to dispatch a division-level headquarters element 
and at least one, possibly two, brigades of combat troops, plus a significant force 
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of military police and engineers, medical and support troops. No doubt such a 
deployment would come at a cost in lives and money, but if done well, the 
Russian armed forces could gain from taking part in the rebuilding of Iraq and by 
working on a larger scale with western forces. However, given the current 
readiness and training of Russian troops, this may not be feasible and some 
sources have intimated an aversion to sending combat elements, even if some 
forces are sent. 
 
The bottom line 
The world has changed since the late 1990’s and Russia's place in the world has 
shifted as well. Mr. Putin certainly has grand ambitions, specifically reestablishing 
Russia as a major power, and possibly a superpower. He has worked 
deliberately and systematically with many secondary powers to stymie US efforts 
around the world. 
 
Certainly Russia recognizes the fact that most former Warsaw Pact members, 
notably Poland, as well as some former republics of the USSR, such as Ukraine, 
currently are members of the coalition, and reaping the benefits, both political 
and economic. Russia has gleaned all the political benefits it can from its anti-war 
stance and has much to gain now by moving beyond that posture and into a 
stance of engagement in Iraq, under the UN flag or not. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Dept of Defense or the United 
States government. 
 
NAVY 
Blue Water Aspirations and Cooperative Footprints 
On August 27, the Russian Navy concluded its participation in the Far East 
Command Post Exercise (CPX). Marking a departure from the trend of 
operations since the fall of communism and an end to the Cold War era, the Far 
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East exercise and recent deployments to the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean 
Sea bolster what some may deem as an ideological and doctrinal reversion to a 
prominent tenet of Soviet Cold War diplomacy - a naval doctrine characterized by 
deterrence and engagement on the world's oceans. 
 
Although under the guise of mutual cooperation and joint compatibility, the Far 
East Command Post Exercise was yet another in a series of recent deployments 
and multilateral maneuvers in which the Russian Navy has engaged throughout 
2003 that signify a return to a blue water focus and competency. Furthermore, 
the Far East exercise succinctly demonstrated the multifaceted arena in which 
Russia's contemporary Navy is asked to navigate; defense against terrorism and 
economic threats near shore as well as projecting global power afar. Chief of the 
Main Headquarters of the Russian Navy, Viktor Kravchenko referred to the 
recently concluded Far East exercise as "unprecedented in the history of the 
national navy as to the scale, the composition of participants and the space 
encompassed by the exercise." (ITAR-TASS; 18 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
Incorporating over 15 federal executive agencies, all branches of the Russian 
armed forces and multilateral participation with Asian-Pacific nations including 
the United States, it correlates with other highly visible deployments and naval 
"firsts" seen in 2003. For the first time in Russian history, cooperative naval 
exercises with the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean were conducted recently as 
well as pioneering exercises founded by direct engagement with the French 
submarine force. These "forward leaning" events depict a developing naval 
doctrine with global aspirations and an adjunct desire for joint compatibility with 
disparate countries. In aggregate, the pace of operations, exercises and 
integrated forums with which the Russian Navy has engaged governments and 
intra-state agencies alike is unprecedented in recent history and consistent with 
the mantra voiced by Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Kuroyedov, Commander-in 
Chief of the Russian Navy. 
 
 22 
Admiral Kuroyedov's comments in a interview with Izvestiya (29 Jul 03; BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) depict not only a redefinition of naval 
doctrine to suit the modern post-Soviet era, but perhaps the genesis of a doctrine 
to suit the complex economic, strategic, national and diplomatic issues that 
confront modern Russia. Against the backdrop of the Command Post Exercise of 
the Russian Pacific Fleet Admiral Kuroyedov stated that, "Today's challenges 
dictate to us the necessity not only of visiting another state under our own flag, 
but carrying out specific missions." In addition, he succinctly illustrated the 
impetus for exercises such as the Far East CPX and out of area deployments by 
stating, "Russia does not need coastal or oceanic fleets. Russia needs a 
multipurpose fleet in order to ensure its national security along the coast and 
defend its interest in any zone of the world's oceans." (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 29 Aug 03; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis) The Pacific 
Fleet's Far East exercise gave credence to Admiral Kuroyedov's concept of 
reconstituting Russia's Navy into a multi-functional force — both in scope and 
magnitude — aiming at "perfecting security measures, protecting the country's 
economic interests and teaming up law-enforcement bodies and the civilian 
population in fighting terrorism." (ITAR-TASS, 15 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis). Given 
the diverse range of participants from Canada, China, South Korea, Japan and 
the United States, the Far East exercise was said to have provided a forum for 
"the strengthening of mutual trust and cooperation in the interests of security of 
the whole region." (ITAR-TASS, 15 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Kuroyedov's emphasis on the reshaping of Russian naval doctrine and the high 
profile deployments of 2003 are consistent with the naval and military doctrinal 
priorities of President Putin and Russian Defense Minister Ivanov. During a state 
visit to Italy, President Putin was explicit in his dissatisfaction with the current 
combat-readiness levels of the modern Russian Navy, stating, "a perennially 
moored navy loses combat capability, and a situation like that is senseless and 
intolerable." (ITAR-TASS; 30 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Putin used the high profile 
deployment of three ships from the Black Sea Fleet to Sicily as a forum to 
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showcase his philosophy and his aspirations of regaining the "clout" that the 
Russian Navy once held on the world's oceans. He also hosted Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi on the Russian missile cruiser Moskva during his state 
visit. The three ships of the Black Sea Fleet will visit Greece on their return 
voyage while one of their sister-ships recently concluded participation in the 
latest naval exercise of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 
(BLACKSEAFOR) of which Russia has been a member since 2001 with Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine. 
 
According to several accounts, Defense Minister Ivanov shares President Putin's 
dissatisfaction with the Navy's readiness and proficiency levels in carrying out the 
precepts of the naval doctrine vital to meeting Russia's defensive, economic and 
diplomatic concerns. Defense Minister Ivanov was quoted by the Interfax News 
Agency as saying that "we are going to do everything so that the departure of 
ships to the sea isn't a special occasion, but becomes a regular occurrence." 
(Associated Press Worldstream, 20 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) That said, it's clear 
that Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy and Admiral of the Fleet 
Kuroyedov has to maneuver among a sea of considerable diplomatic and political 
pressures while attempting to reconstitute the Navy to it's once capable form. To 
complicate the landscape even further, Admiral Kuroyedov must do so with 
limited resources, an aging fleet and modest modernization plans that exclude 
construction accounts for aircraft carriers or submarines in excess of 12,000 
tons. Clearly, the loss of the submarine K-159 in recent days tempers the 
collective successes that the Navy has otherwise claimed this year. 
 
With the task at hand, it is clear that the Russian Navy has had a productive 
year. "When the first half of the training year is over, forces of the two Russian 
fleets accomplished a mission in the Indian Ocean...a major exercise of two 
fleets took place in the Baltic Sea in midsummer...Russian naval forces 
participated in several international exercises including the Russian-French 
exercises in the Norwegian Sea, Fairway of Peace'2003, BALTOPS'2003 (and) 
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Indra'2003. (WPS-Defense and Security, 16 Aug 03 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) The recently concluded Far East Command Post Exercise, high 
profile deployments and the multilateral exercises with the Indian and French 
navies demonstrate that the Russian Navy is focused on regaining the blue water 
footprint that once was a hallmark of the Russian naval fleet – and doing so in 
concert with it's coordinated defensive efforts at home. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
GEORGIA 
Out go the Americans, out go the lights 
On September 2, hundreds of residents in the Georgian Marneuli region blocked 
the central highway linking Eastern Georgia with Tbilisi. The protesters 
demanded the return of the electricity supply to the region after being without 
power for a week. (ITAR-TASS, 2 Sep 03; FBIS- SOV-2003-0902 via World 
News Connection) These events coincide with the RAO UES (Russia’s joint-
stock power company United Energy Systems) acquisition of 75% of the shares 
in the Tbilisi power systems from the American-held AES company. RAO UES 
also acquired the rights to manage Khrami-1 and Khrami-2 hydropower stations, 
100% of the shares of Mtkvari nuclear power station and 50% of the shares of 
Transenergy nuclear power plant. (Financial Times, 4 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
At a press conference held on August 25, Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze informed journalists that, "there was nothing unusual" about the 
UES monopoly and that he and UES CEO Anatoli Chubais had decided that the 
company’s role in Georgia would be relegated to "purely economic interests." 
(Interfax, 25 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0825 via World News Connection) 
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Adding salt to the wound, the U.S. Ambassador to Georgia, Richard Miles, spoke 
on Georgian Rustavi-2 TV on August 16 and called on the Georgians to think in 
"a little bit more modern way." He denied that the relationship between Georgia 
and the U.S. had worsened and that the departure of the U.S. company AES, 
formerly seen as "the flagship of American investment" in Georgia, was political 
in nature. Rather, the deal was solely a commercial venture that was cancelled 
because the company was not recouping its investment and hardly recovering its 
daily operational costs. (Financial Times Information, 16 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
In a startling reversal, Shevardnadze announced on September 1 that Georgian 
authorities are ready to assist Russia in repatriating Chechen refuges from the 
Pankisi Gorge. (Financial Times, 1 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis) In a meeting with the 
Russian delegation led by the Minister for Chechnya, Stanislav Ilyasov, 
Shevardnadze said that Russia was ready for the return of all the Chechen 
refugees to their republic and would "create conditions for their life and work" 
which include housing and unemployment allowances for those unable to find 
work. At present, about 3,800 Chechen refugees (according to Russian sources) 
are living in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. (ITAR-TASS, 1 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0901 via World News Connection) This announcement comes on the heels of 
Georgia's National Security Council announcement of support for the decision of 
the U.N. Security Council Committee to include Chechen warlord Shamil Basaev 
in the Consolidated List of Sanctions known as the "black list." (ITAR-TASS, 30 
Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0830 via World News Connection) Not coincidentally, 
units of the Russian North Caucasus-based troops will begin to aid Georgian 
border guards at the Argun section to guard the Chechen section of the Russian-
Georgian frontier, Deputy Head of the Russian Border Guard Service Colonel 
General Mansur Valiyev claimed in an interview with Itar-Tass. (1 Sep 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0901 via World News Connection) 
 
Also notable, Shevardnadze will not be able to participate in the general debate 
at the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly this September. The 
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deputy press secretary of the Georgian president, Bondo Mdzinarishvili, told 
journalists that Shevardnadze was not going to New York because of a lack of 
funds. (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 2 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0902 via World News 
Connection) Lack of funds or lack of support from the United States? 
 
Electricity is not the only thing failing in Georgia… 
The recent failure in the Georgian parliament, on both August 15 and 26, to 
endorse needed budget cuts may mask a newly emerging tug-of-war between 
the Shevardnadze government and a recently-formed opposition bloc known as 
the Burdjanadze-Democrats. The Georgian parliament was supposed to ratify 
budget sequesters proposed by the government in response to demands made 
in early July by a visiting International Monetary Fund (IMF) delegation. (ITAR-
TASS, 16 and 27 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0816 and FBIS-SOV-2003-0827 via 
World News Connection) The fund had made disbursement of the third and final 
installment of a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility loan contingent on 
sweeping budget cuts, passage of a new Tax Code, and the abolition of cuts in 
electricity tariffs. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0826 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Minister of State, Avtandil Djorbenadze, who came to parliament to brief deputies 
on the planned budget cuts, blamed speaker Nino Burdjanadze for the 
legislature's failure to ensure the government met the IMF deadline of mid-
August. Burdjanadze, who on August 21 formally announced the creation of his 
eponymous new opposition bloc, the Burdjanadze-Democrats (ITAR-TASS, 22 
Aug 03), responded to these allegations by stating that the proposed cuts will be 
approved only if the government acknowledges responsibility for the budget 
shortfall and resigns. In addition, the President of the National Bank of Georgia, 
Irakliy Managadze, informed journalists on August 21 that Georgia was on the 
verge of announcing a default. (ITAR-TASS, 21 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0821 
via World News Connection) However, in the midst of this financial crisis, State 
Minister Djorbenadze announced on August 23 that he had secured IMF support 
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for a debt-restructuring deal with the Paris Club at a meeting with Jonathan 
Dunn, the IMF's representative in Georgia. (Financial Times, 28 Aug 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) Georgia's foreign debt currently stands at $ 1.75 billion, or 47 
percent of the country's. GDP. (ITAR-TASS, 21 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003 via 
World News Connection) 
 
ARMENIA 
Relations with Greece expanded further 
At the end of a three-day official visit to Armenia, General Georgios 
Antonakopoulos, the Greek Army's chief of staff, announced on September 3 that 
Greece would increase its military assistance to Armenia. (Noyan Tapan, 04 Sep 
03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0904 via World News Connection) Antonakopoulos signed a 
new memorandum of understanding with his Armenian counterpart, Deputy 
Defense Minister General Mikael Harutiunian, and agreed to expand bilateral 
military cooperation with the completion of a more detailed cooperation plan by 
November. According to the agreement, Armenia will deploy a 30-man unit of 
troops for peacekeeping duties under the command of Greek forces in Kosovo. 
(Yerevan Mediamax 3 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0903 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Armenia and the CIS 
Nikolai Bordyuzha, the secretary of the CIS Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, met in Yerevan with Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian 
and President Robert Kocharian and Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian on 
August 25 and 26. Topics discussed included expanding military-technical 
cooperation among signatories of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, unspecified 
aspects of regional security, and the situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan. 
(Yerevan Arminfo News Agency 26 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0826 via World 
News Connection) 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
 28 
Let the games begin… 
On August 22, Azerbaijan's official press published a list of presidential 
candidates registered by the Central Election Commission. (Interfax, 22 Aug 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0822 via World News Connection) Of the 12 candidates listed 
(see full list below), 7 are considered to be serious competitors: (spite illness) 
incumbent President Heydar Aliyev, nominated by the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan 
party; Prime Minister Ilham Aliyev, nominated by a group of citizens in the 
Nakhichevan exclave; Isa Gambar, nominated by the Musavat party; Ilyas 
Ismailov, nominated by a Popular Front group; Etibar Mamedov, nominated by 
the National Independence Party; Hafiz Hajiyev, nominated by the Muasir 
Musavat party; and Ali Kerimli, nominated by Azerbaijan’s Popular Front. 
Campaigning began on August 16 and will finish on October 14, with the first 
round of elections scheduled to take place on October 15, 2003. A candidate 
must gain 65% of the vote during the first round of elections to avoid a run-off. 
 
CHECHNYA 
Democracy — Russian style 
The Russian sponsored and organized elections in Chechnya seem, at best, to 
be a mechanism to guarantee Russian control in the North Caucasus, while 
further undermining the authority of the (anti-Moscow) Chechen President Aslan 
Maskhadov. 
 
On August 20, Russian presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky told Interfax that 
the upcoming presidential elections in Chechnya will make the regime of Aslan 
Maskhadov absolutely irrelevant to indigenous Chechens and to international 
observers present for the elections. (INTERFAX, 20 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0820 via World News Connection) According to Yastrzhembsky, the Chechen 
Elections Committee has sent invitations to about two hundred members of 
international organizations, including the US Federal Election Commission, 
through the Russian Central Elections Committee (CEC) with Foreign Ministry 
assistance. (ITAR-TASS 20 Aug 03 and Interfax 22 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
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0820 and FBIS-SOV-2003-0822, both via World News Connection) Once the 
Chechen Elections Committee had announced the first, incomplete list of 
presidential candidates to run in the October 5 presidential election, the 
spokesman for the federal troops in the North Caucasus, Colonel Ilya Shabalkin 
supplied Moscow with another reason to pour troops into Chechnya: purportedly, 
three million dollars have come from abroad to Aslan Maskhadov and Arab 
mercenary Abu Walid for the purpose of "wrecking" the presidential elections. In 
response, special units of the 42nd Division have begun training to "ensure 
security of the presidential elections." (ITAR-TASS, 20 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0820 via World News Connection) On August 25, the CEC requested the FSB 
and the Interior Ministry to ensure the security of presidential candidates in 
Chechnya. Inevitably, this will lead to an increase in the ranks of the FSB’s 
protégé in Chechnya, the Chechen Security Police, which is headed by Ramzan 
Kadyrov, son of the incumbent (Moscow-installed) presidential candidate Akhmat 
Kadyrov. (ITAR-TASS, 22 Aug 03; FBIS-2003-0822 via World News Connection; 
and Washington Post 25 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) At present, Kadyrov’s force in 
Chechnya has grown to several thousand. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 28 Aug 03; What 
the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis) An increase of FSB presence in Chechnya, via 
the Chechen Security Police, will further serve to exacerbate the already tense 
relationship between the FSB and the GRU units stationed in Chechnya. 
(Additionally, ITAR-TASS reported on 27 August that the Interior Ministry of 
Chechnya in Grozny announced that over 8,000 staffers of various "power" 
services will be present to ensure security during the presidential elections in 
Chechnya. The department affiliation of these "civil servants" is not available.) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Advancing the SCO and the Outsiders in Central Asia 
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The recent meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) constitutes 
another step towards formalizing relations between the states of Central Asia and 
countries with a keen interest in the region. While working under the umbrella of 
fighting terrorism and rendering legal cooperation more fluid, both China and 
Russia hope to make the SCO an effective organization that counteracts the 
influence of the American presence in the region. Furthermore, China and Russia 
have extended to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan their attempts to improve relations 
and be more active partners along the Afghan border. 
 
From 4-5 September 2003, the foreign ministers of China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in Tashkent, to discuss the 
implementation of agreements that emerged from the May SCO meeting in 
Moscow. While the original purpose of the organization was to resolve Sino-
Soviet (Russian) border disputes, the agenda has expanded to include more 
general threats to the member states regarding issues such as trafficking in 
weapons and drugs, organized crime, religious extremism, separatism, and 
terrorism. (RFE/RL, 5 Sep 03 via www.rferl.org; KABAR, 0618 GMT, 4 Sep 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0904 via World News Connection) Steps are also being taken to 
improve economic relations between the SCO member states; a possible 
reduction of trade barriers will be taken up at meetings later in the month. 
 
Though the recent gatherings focused largely on combining efforts in the fight 
against terrorism, there was also an underlying political tone in the 
developments. The planned SCO Regional Anti-terrorism Center was to be sited 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, a location that was agreed upon by SCO members at the 
May meetings. In an effort to improve relations with Uzbekistan, Russia lobbied 
to have the location of the Regional Anti-terrorism Center switched to Tashkent. 
(RFE/RL, 5 Sep 03, via www.rferl.org) There is no doubt that Russia’s close 
relations with Kyrgyzstan influenced the latter’s acceptance of the location 
change, but it is not clear that Uzbekistan will be won over that easily. 
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While Uzbek President Islam Karimov, in his 1 September address to parliament, 
remarked on the importance of relations with Russia — especially as a trading 
partner — Karimov also indicated that support for Russia did not imply that 
Uzbekistan was "drifting toward Russia" and away from the U.S. (RFE/RL, 4 Sep 
03, via www.rferl.org). Rather, Uzbekistan realizes the practicality of being 
courted both by Russia and the U.S. and moving the Regional Anti-terrorism 
Center to Tashkent is but one reward for its independent streak. 
 
Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov, who referred to the SCO as a "factor of 
stability in the region, an influential factor in regional and world policy," (ITAR-
TASS, 0830 GMT, 2 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0902 via World News Connection) 
has welcomed both Russian and Chinese involvement along the borders. For 
many years, the Russian Army has assisted Tajikistan in guarding its borders 
and recent exercises affirmed the closeness of that relationship. (ITAR-TASS, 
0507 GMT, 4 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0904 via World News Connection) The 
relationship between China and Tajikistan, however, is improving on a more 
formal level. 
 
China’s Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Tajikistan from 1-2 September, 
where he met with Rakhmonov and others. The result of the visit was a joint 
communiqué that seemed intended to satisfy the wishes of both countries. 
Tajikistan, for example, affirmed its support for "one China" and pledged that it 
would not establish official relations with Taiwan. China, for its part, stated that it 
would support Tajikistan in its efforts to consolidate national independence. 
(XINHUA, 1006 GMT, 3 Sep 03; FBIS-CHI-2003-0903 via World News 
Connection) Both countries came to an agreement on border checkpoints and 
reiterated that the coordination of efforts against terrorism and extremism should 
be managed through the SCO. (XINHUA, 1422 GMT, 2 Sep 03; FBIS-CHI-2003-
0902; also ITAR-TASS, 1802 GMT, 2 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0902 via World 
News Connection) 
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There appears to be a desire to use the SCO to strengthen the cooperation 
among member countries and to create a regional hegemonic block. The SCO is 
one way that China and Russia can be actively involved participants influencing 
the policies of Central Asian states. While India and Pakistan are rumored to 
have some interest in joining the SCO, there have been no formal requests. 
Though membership to the SCO is technically open, it is unlikely that the U.S. 
would request membership. And the unlikeliness of that request may strengthen 
Chinese and Russian commitment to the organization. 
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